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I. INTRODUCTION 
We live in an age marked by natural disasters, pandemics, and terrorism. 
Individually and in combination, these destructive forces provoke socio-
political and economic havoc across the country. Pennsylvanians are 
intimately familiar with the devastating effects of flooding, severe tornadoes, 
and crippling snowstorms. Moreover, the very landscape of Pennsylvania 
bears the scars of the wreckage of a failed terrorist airplane hijacking. Such 
disasters, be they attributable to nature or humankind, present unique 
challenges to state and local governments. During such crisis, officials—from 
small-town mayors to the Governor—are called upon to make critical, time-
sensitive decisions. Some of these decisions will be wise and prove effective, 
while others may not. Against this backdrop of seemingly impending crisis, it 
is critical that the legal powers of elected officials be clearly understood 
before they are needed. 
This article explores one such disaster-related legal issue by answering 
the question: When the Governor of Pennsylvania declares a state of 
emergency, what are his emergency management powers, and what is the 
breadth of the scope of these powers? Answering this question requires an 
understanding of state governors' powers in general, which is presented in 
                                                        
* Patricia Sweeney is the Health Commissioner for the Mahoning 
County Board of Health and an Assistant Professor at the University of 
Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public Health. Ryan Joyce is a 2010 graduate 
of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law and an Associate at Swartz 
Campbell, LLC. 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a n d  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  L a w  
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 150 
 
  
Spring 2012 
Part II of the article. Part III discusses the constitutional and statutory 
authority for the Pennsylvania Governor's emergency management powers. 
The apparent breadth of these powers is explored in Part IV, wherein the 
Governor's powers are analyzed in the context of legislative history. Part V 
analyzes effective "checks" on the Governor's powers and details a specific 
instance of a legal challenge to the Governor's declaration of a state of 
emergency. Part VI concludes with the answer to the central inquiry. 
II. GENERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT POWERS OF STATE 
GOVERNORS 
As a state's chief executive officer, "its governor is primarily responsible 
for protecting the public safety and welfare of the people of that state . . . ."1 
Gubernatorial duties and powers with respect to the protection of the "public 
safety and welfare" are prescribed by a state's constitution and statutes.2 The 
duties and, in particular, powers of governors in terms of emergency 
management are of special importance and, as a corollary, the subject of some 
debate. While the general consensus is that state governors possess 
"extraordinary"3 or even "sweeping"4 emergency management powers during 
declared emergencies, "[e]mergency powers are not absolute."5 
"Reflecting their leading role in disaster response, governors are granted 
emergency powers to fulfill their responsibilities in extraordinary 
                                                        
1 David A. Trissell & Diane Donley, Coordinated Federal Emergency 
Responses within the National Response Plan, in A LEGAL GUIDE TO 
HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT FOR STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 151 (Earnest B. Abbott & Otto J. Hetzel eds., 2006). 
2 38 AM. JUR. 2D Governor § 4 (2009). 
3 Trissell & Donley, supra note 1, at 151. 
4  WILLIAM C. NICHOLSON, EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 213 (2003). 
5 NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR BEST PRACTICES, 
THE GOVERNOR’S GUIDE TO HOMELAND SECURITY 14 (2007) [hereinafter 
NGA, GOVERNOR’S GUIDE], available at http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/ 
NGA/files/pdf/0703GOVGUIDEHS.PDF. 
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circumstances."6 The range of powers includes: suspending state statutes and 
regulations; ordering evacuations; commandeering the use of private 
property; controlling access to disaster sites; rationing supplies such as food, 
water, and fuel; implementing specific public health response measures; and 
authorizing emergency funds without prior legislative consent.7 In order to 
invoke such powers, a governor must declare a state of emergency, usually 
through issuance of an executive order or a proclamation.8 
III. SOURCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR 
THE PENNSYLVANIA GOVERNOR'S EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
POWERS 
The Governor of Pennsylvania, like all state governors, derives broad 
authority from the state's Constitution. The Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania vests "supreme executive power" in the 
Governor and directs him to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed."9 
The Governor functions as "commander-in-chief of the military forces of the 
Commonwealth . . . ."10  The Governor may appoint officers, 11  pardon 
criminals,12 and approve or veto bills sent to him by the General Assembly.13 
                                                        
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8  Id. "The authority for executive orders is found in both state 
constitutions and state statutes, or is implied by the powers assigned to the 
governor." See NGA, GOVERNOR’S GUIDE, supra note 5. In at least seven 
states, the authority for issuing executive orders and proclamations has been 
supplemented by case law. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE 
BOOK OF THE STATES 192 tbl. 4.5 (2009). 
9 PA. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
10 PA. CONST. art. IV, § 7. 
11 PA. CONST. art. IV, § 8. 
12 PA. CONST. art. IV, § 9. 
13 PA. CONST. art. IV, § 15. 
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It is noteworthy that the Constitution does not expressly authorize the 
issuance of executive orders and proclamations.14 
The Governor of Pennsylvania assumes his emergency management 
powers under specific provisions of the Emergency Management Services 
Code ("the Code").15 One of the stated purposes for the Code is to "[c]larify 
and strengthen the role[] of the Governor . . . in prevention of, preparation 
for, response to and recovery from disasters."16  Furthermore, the Code 
announces that it does not intend to "[l]imit, modify or abridge the authority 
of the Governor to proclaim martial law or exercise any other powers vested 
in him under the Constitution, statutes or common law of this 
Commonwealth."17 
Section 7301, entitled "General authority of Governor," addresses 
emergency declarations and the Governor's emergency management 
powers.18 The Governor is designated as the State's foremost first responder 
and is thus "responsible for meeting the dangers to this Commonwealth and 
people presented by disasters."19 The Governor is empowered to "issue . . . 
executive orders [and] proclamations"20  for the purpose of declaring a 
                                                        
14 See Shapp v. Butera, 348 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975) 
("There is no mention in the Constitution of 'Executive Orders'."). But see 35 
PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(b) (2011) ("Under this part, the Governor may issue, 
amend and rescind executive orders, proclamations and regulations . . . ."). 
15 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7101–04 (2011). 
16 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7103(4) (2011). 
17 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7104(3) (2011). 
18 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(a) (2011). 
19 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(a) (2011). 
20  35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(b) (2011). The executive order or 
proclamation must "indicate the nature of the disaster, the area or areas 
threatened and the conditions which have brought the disaster about . . . ." Id. 
at § 7301(c). The order or proclamation must be "disseminated promptly by 
means calculated to bring its contents to the attention of the general public," 
and a copy must be filed with the Pennsylvania Emergency Management 
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"disaster emergency," when a "disaster has occurred or . . . the occurrence or 
the threat of a disaster is imminent."21 Absent the Governor's renewal, the 
declaration of a disaster emergency automatically terminates after 90 days. 
Alternatively, the General Assembly may terminate a state of emergency at 
any time.22 
Subsection (f) of 7301 specifically enumerates the emergency 
management powers conferred upon the Governor by the Code. The 
Governor may: 
(1) Suspend the provisions of any regulatory statute 
prescribing the procedures for conduct of 
Commonwealth business, or the orders, rules or 
regulations of any Commonwealth agency, if strict 
compliance with the provisions of any statute, order, rule 
or regulation would in any way prevent, hinder or delay 
necessary action in coping with the emergency. 
(2) Utilize all available resources of the Commonwealth 
Government and each political subdivision of this 
Commonwealth as reasonably necessary to cope with the 
disaster emergency. 
(3) Transfer the direction, personnel or functions of 
Commonwealth agencies or units thereof for the purpose 
of performing or facilitating emergency services. 
                                                                                                                              
Agency (PEMA). Id. The order or proclamation has the "force and effect of 
law." Id. at § 7301(b). See Pa. Dep’t of Health v. N. Hills Passavant Hosp., 
674 A.2d 1141, 1146 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) (holding that "an executive 
order authorized by statute and intended to implement or supplement that 
statute has the force of law."). See 37 Pa. Bull. 1957 (Apr. 28, 2007), 
available at http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol37/37-17/731.html 
(providing an example of a proclamation of disaster emergency issued by the 
Pennsylvania Governor). 
21 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(c) (2011). See also 35 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 7102 (2011) (defining a disaster emergency). 
22 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(c) (2011). 
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(4) Subject to any applicable requirements for 
compensation under section 7313(10) (relating to powers 
and duties), commandeer or utilize any private, public or 
quasi-public property if necessary to cope with the 
disaster emergency. 
(5) Direct and compel the evacuation of all or part of the 
population from any stricken or threatened area within 
this Commonwealth if this action is necessary for the 
preservation of life or other disaster mitigation, response 
or recovery. 
(6) Prescribe routes, modes of transportation and 
destinations in connection with evacuation. 
(7) Control ingress and egress to and from a disaster 
area, the movement of persons within the area and the 
occupancy of premises therein. 
(8) Suspend or limit the sale, dispensing or transportation 
of alcoholic beverages, firearms, explosives and 
combustibles.23 
Subsequent sections of the Code grant the Governor the following 
additional authority: "to enter into purchase, lease or other arrangements with 
any Federal agency for temporary housing units" and "[to] assist any political 
subdivision of this Commonwealth . . . to acquire sites necessary for such 
temporary housing . . . by advancing or lending funds" appropriated for any 
purpose by the General Assembly or to "pass through" funds furnished by 
"any agency, public or private";24  "to clear or remove from publicly or 
                                                        
23  35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(f) (2011). Note that subparagraph (1) 
specifically authorizes the Governor to "suspend the provisions of any 
regulatory statute" as conditions necessitate. Id. (emphasis added). A 
discussion of what distinguishes a regulatory statute from other types of 
statutes or statutes in general appears later in this memo. See discussion infra 
Part V.A. 
24 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7302(a)(1)-(2) (2011). 
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privately owned land or water, debris and wreckage which may threaten 
public health or safety, or public or private property," through the use of 
Commonwealth agencies or instrumentalities;25  "to apply to the Federal 
Government, on behalf of [a] political subdivision, for a loan and to receive 
and disburse the proceeds of any approved loan to any applicant political 
subdivision;26 to accept and disburse Federal dollars "to meet disaster-related 
necessary expenses or serious needs of individuals or families."27 Finally, the 
Code establishes the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) 
to oversee and implement a statewide civil defense and disaster relief 
program.28 The Governor heads the Agency's Council and has the power to 
appoint the Agency's Director as well as various representatives to serve as 
nonvoting members of the Council.29 
IV. BREADTH OF THE PENNSYLVANIA GOVERNOR'S EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT POWERS 
The plain language of the Code evinces the expansive scope of the 
Governor's emergency management powers. A manifest legislative purpose 
behind the Code is to "strengthen the role[] of the Governor . . . in prevention 
of, preparation for, response to and recovery from disasters."30 Thus, the 
Code aims to delineate and bolster the Governor's powers vis-à-vis the entire 
arc of emergency management, from prevention efforts to mitigation and 
recovery measures. In a section entitled "Limitations," the General Assembly 
emphasized that the Code in no way circumscribes the usual powers vested in 
                                                        
25 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7303(a)(1) (2011). 
26 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7304(1) (2011) (This authority arises only when 
the Governor requests the President to declare a major disaster in the 
Commonwealth.). 
27 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7305(b) (2011) (This authority arises only when 
those individuals or families have been adversely impacted by a major 
disaster declared by the President.). 
28 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7311 (2011). 
29 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7312(a), (e) (2011). 
30 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7103(4) (2011) (emphasis added). 
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the Governor under the Constitution, statutes, regulations, or common law of 
the Commonwealth.31 Finally, as noted above, Subsection (f) of 7301 and 
subsequent sections of the Code grant the Governor overarching authority to 
suspend the operation of some laws, order evacuations, commandeer 
property, and pursue other extraordinary measures in the interest of "meeting 
the dangers to this Commonwealth and people presented by disasters."32 A 
review of legislative history behind the Code does not militate against a broad 
interpretation of the Governor's emergency management powers.33 The Code 
was introduced on September 27, 1977, as Senate Bill 1104,34 sponsored by 
Senators Mellow, Kury, McKinney, Sweeney, Early, Ross, and Holl.35 
Senator Kury addressed the Senate the following week, stating that the 
impetus behind the Bill was a joint study of the Committee on Environmental 
Resources and the Committee on Consumer Affairs investigating "the energy 
                                                        
31 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7104(3) (2011). 
32 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(a), (f) (2011). 
33  Researching the legislative history of Pennsylvania's statutes is 
notoriously difficult and typically yields little. 
Many of the types of documents that are available for 
compiling a complete legislative history on the federal level are 
just not available in Pennsylvania. Hearings are not published 
and in most situations committee reports are not 
distributed. . . . [I]n most instances the researcher has no option 
but to look at floor debate from the House and Senate. 
MARC SILVERMAN, PENNSYLVANIA RESEARCH: PRIMARY SOURCES, 
LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIALS, BARCO LAW LIBRARY 
RESEARCH GUIDES, http://www.law.pitt.edu/library/paresearch (follow 
"Legislative and Administrative Materials" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 25, 
2012). 
34 S. 1104, 161st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1978). 
35 BILL INFORMATION:  SENATE BILL 1104, PENNSYLVANIA GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY, http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/bill_history.cfm? 
syear=1977&sind=0&body=S&type=B&bn=1104 (last visited Jan. 25, 2012). 
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crisis of the winter of 1977."36 The Senator urged his colleagues to deliberate 
quickly so that the legislation would be enacted "before the cold hits us again 
this winter."37 The only notable resistance to the Bill came from Senator 
Tilghman who took issue with Section 7503,38 wherein municipalities are 
required to make substantial outlays for, inter alia, a fully equipped and 
staffed "emergency operations center."39 According to Senator Tilghman, the 
Section would have the effect of "mandating . . . extremely heavy costs on 
every political subdivision in the Commonwealth . . . ."40  Tellingly, no 
Senator objected to any provision for the broad grant of the Governor's 
emergency management powers. 
The most substantive remarks on the House floor came from 
Representative DeMedio who independently and simultaneously drafted 
legislation (House Bill 1635) designed to "correct deficiencies in disaster 
planning and control . . . ."41 Seeing the Bills as having a strikingly "similar [] 
purpose" and noting that "the Senate Bill ha[d] cleared the Senate," he retired 
his Bill and fully supported the Senate Bill. 42  Representative DeMedio 
announced: "The essential object of the [C]ode is to make provisions for 
powers and duties of state and local government bodies and agencies under 
disaster conditions."43 Specifically, the Code would "replace[] the existing 
State Council of Civil Defense" with PEMA; expand the "state's role [in] . . . 
                                                        
36  S. JOURNAL, 161st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., vol. 2, at 894 (Pa. 
1977). 
37 Id. 
38  S. JOURNAL, 161st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., vol. 1, at 182 (Pa. 
1978). 
39 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7503(2) (1978). 
40  S. JOURNAL, 161st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., vol. 1, at 182 (Pa. 
1978). 
41 H. JOURNAL, 161st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., vol. 5, at 3663–64 (Pa. 
1978). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
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develop[ing] and maintain[ing] a comprehensive program of emergency 
management activities that supplements, facilitate[s] and provide[s] direction 
when needed to local efforts before, during and after" disaster emergencies; 
and, renew the state's responsibility for requesting and procuring "federal 
resources to deal with emergencies."44 As in the Senate, no member of the 
House rose to register a complaint with respect to the expansive powers 
bestowed upon the Governor. 
As the Bill proceeded through Committee, it was subject to multiple 
considerations in both the House and Senate, and amendments were proposed 
and approved. However, through seven versions—Printer's Numbers: 1306 
(original), 1434, 1559, 1616, 1642, 2107, and 2213 (final)—the only 
significant change to Section 7301 came early in the process. Subsection (c) 
of 7301 was altered to extend the duration of the period of the Governor's 
declared disaster emergency from 30 days to 90 days.45 This is significant 
insofar as a shorter period is perceived by the National Governors 
Association (NGA) to constitute a "limitation[] on emergency powers."46 The 
NGA notes that ten states require that emergency declarations expire in less 
than 30 days, 16 states do not permit emergency declarations to exceed 30 
days, and just 5 states allow emergency declarations to last 60 days or more.47 
Pennsylvania's Governor has the authority to declare one of the longest states 
of emergency of any governor in the United States. 
Ultimately, and without a single challenge to the contemplated powers 
granted to the Governor, the House 48  and Senate 49  both unanimously 
approved the Bill. Then-Governor Milton Shapp signed the Bill into law on 
                                                        
44 Id. 
45 See S. 1104, 161st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1978). 
46 NGA, GOVERNOR’S GUIDE, supra note 5. 
47 Id. at 15. 
48 H. JOURNAL, 162nd Gen. Assemb., vol. 5, at 3662–63 (Pa. Nov. 14, 
1978) (the vote was 190-0). 
49 S. JOURNAL, 162nd Gen. Assemb., vol. 2, at 1167 (Pa. Nov. 15, 1978) 
(the vote was 47-0). 
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November 26, 1978.50 The Code has been amended on numerous occasions 
since its enactment. Notably, however, Section 7301 was amended just once 
in July 1988. The amendment in question pertained to Subsection (f)(4) of 
7301 and clarified—as well as arguably expanded—the Governor's 
commandeering power. The Subsection's language granting the Governor 
authority to commandeer or utilize any private property, if necessary, to cope 
with [a] disaster emergency was amended to grant the Governor authority to 
"commandeer or utilize any private, public or quasi-public property . . . ."51 
V. CHECKS ON AND CHALLENGES TO THE PENNSYLVANIA GOVERNOR'S 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT POWERS 
Notwithstanding the apparent breadth of gubernatorial emergency 
management powers, "[a governor's] [e]mergency powers are not absolute."52 
For instance, a governor cannot act in such a manner as to violate her state 
constitution or other statutes.53  To assure that "the response to a[n] . . . 
emergency is not impaired by legal uncertainty and that citizens are protected 
                                                        
50 See S. JOURNAL, 161st Gen. Assemb., supra note 35. 
51 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(f)(4) (2011). 
52 NGA, GOVERNOR’S GUIDE, supra note 5. 
53 Furthermore, the Pennsylvania Governor, along with all other state 
governors, is limited by the United States Constitution, federal statutes, and 
Supreme Court precedent.  Federal statutes and regulations trump state 
statutes and regulations, and "[g]overnors . . . do not have the authority to 
waive federal statutes or regulations." NGA, GOVERNOR’S GUIDE, supra note 
5, at 15. Even in times of crisis, governors must request waivers of statutes or 
regulations from relevant federal agencies. Equally true, state governors are 
bound by the decisions of the Highest Court in the Land. For instance, in 
Perpich v. Department of Defense, the Supreme Court held that the plain 
language of Article I of the Constitution established that Congress could 
authorize members of the National Guard of the United States to be ordered 
to active duty for purposes of training outside the country without the consent 
of state governors. 496 U.S. 334 (1990). 
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from arbitrary government action,"54 it is important to understand not only the 
conceded breadth of a governor's powers, but also the existence and function 
of checks on those powers. This Part will explore four limiting factors as they 
relate to the emergency management powers of the Governor of 
Pennsylvania: (A) qualified suspension of laws, (B) separation of powers, (C) 
judicial review, and (D) the scope of an emergency. 
A. SUSPENSION OF REGULATORY STATUTES 
Subsection (f)(1) of 7301 grants the Governor authority to "suspend the 
provisions of any regulatory statute prescribing the procedures for conduct of 
Commonwealth business," as exigent circumstances may require. 55  This 
triggers numerous questions: What is a so-called regulatory statute? Are 
regulatory statutes a narrowly defined category or subset of statutes? Is the 
Governor thus constrained to suspending only provisions of regulatory 
statutes and powerless to suspend provisions of other, ostensibly "non-
regulatory" statutes? Not surprisingly, the Emergency Management Services 
Code does not furnish a definition of "regulatory statute."56 
Pennsylvania case law provides insight regarding the meaning of 
"regulatory statute." In Commonwealth v. CSX Transportation, Inc., the 
Superior Court stated: "[g]enerally, a 'regulatory statute' is the result of the 
exercise of the state's police power to enact regulations to promote the public 
health, morals or safety, and the general well-being of the community."57 The 
court deemed the Fish and Boat Code to be a regulatory statute given its 
                                                        
54  John A. Bozza, Crisis in the Making: What is Wrong with 
Pennsylvania Public Health Law, 3 PITT. J. ENVTL. PUB. HEALTH L. 1, 3 
(2009) (emphasis added). 
55 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(f)(1) (proposed 1988) (emphasis added). 
56 In fact, a search of the entire Pennsylvania statutes yields only nine 
other references to "regulatory statute." Again, the term is not defined in 
connection with any of these references. One statutory section, establishing 
Commonwealth Court jurisdiction over "regulatory criminal cases," will 
receive further treatment herein. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 762 (2011). 
57 639 A.2d 1213, 1214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). 
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manifest purpose to prevent the pollution of waters in order to promote and 
protect fishing interests. There are other asserted examples of regulatory 
statutes in addition to the Fish and Boat Code. In Commonwealth v. Reed, the 
court reasoned that "[b]ecause the legislature empowered the [Pennsylvania 
Game] Commission to protect, propagate, manage, and preserve the game or 
wildlife of the Commonwealth, it is clear that [the Game and Wildlife Code] 
is a regulatory statute . . . ."58 Further, describing a "regulatory statute" as 
marked by an "overall character as a statute regulating certain conduct within 
the state," the Commonwealth Court "conclude[d], after reviewing the entire 
[Clean Streams Law] and its purposes, that [it] is a 'regulatory statute.'"59 To 
clarify, the Pa Op Attorney General opined that "[t]he Water Obstructions 
Act is a 'regulatory statute,' the purposes of which are to preserve the public's 
right of navigation; to protect life and property from hazards created by 
unsupervised placement of water obstructions; to control the obstruction of 
flood flows; and to protect the regimen of streams."60 
Section 762 of the Judicial Code warrants further exploration, especially 
with regard to its reference to regulatory statutes. The Section states: 
[T]he Commonwealth Court shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of the courts of 
common pleas in . . . criminal actions or proceedings for 
the violation of any . . . regulatory statute administered 
by any Commonwealth agency subject to Subchapter A 
of Chapter 5 of Title 2 (relating to practice and procedure 
of Commonwealth agencies). The term "regulatory 
statute" as used in this subparagraph does not include 
any provision of Title 18 (relating to crimes and 
offenses).61 
                                                        
58 Commonwealth v. Reed, 696 A.2d 199, 201 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). 
59 Commonwealth v. Tyson, 427 A.2d 283, 285 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981). 
60 1977 Pa. Op. Att'y Gen. 73, at 7. 
61 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 762(a)(2)(ii) (2011). 
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It can be inferred from this language that regulatory statutes are statutes that 
are primarily, if not exclusively, administered by Commonwealth agencies. 
Does it follow that these regulatory statutes comprise a unique or narrower 
class of statutes, traditionally the province of Commonwealth agencies? 
Furthermore, can the term "Commonwealth agencies" be read to mean 
"administrative agencies" in the traditional sense,62 such that the Governor 
truly is constrained to suspending certain regulatory statutes as administered 
by certain administrative agencies? Not necessarily. 
Commonwealth agencies, within the meaning of Section 762 of the 
Judicial Code, are those agencies subject to the Administrative Law and 
Procedure provisions of the Pennsylvania Statutes.63 Section 501(a) of the 
pertinent Subchapter A states: "[t]his subchapter shall apply to all 
Commonwealth agencies."64 Elsewhere in Title 2, the term "Commonwealth 
agencies" is defined to include "[a]ny executive agency or independent 
agency."65 The term "executive agencies" is further defined to include "[t]he 
Governor and the departments, boards, commissions, authorities and other 
officers and agencies of the Commonwealth government," while the term 
"independent agencies" is further defined to include "[b]oards, commissions, 
authorities and other agencies and officers of the Commonwealth government 
[that] are not subject to the policy supervision and control of the Governor."66 
Even a cursory evaluation of these definitions demonstrates that the term 
                                                        
62 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 72 (9th ed. 2009) (Defining the term 
“administrative agency” as “a governmental body with the authority to 
implement and administer particular legislation.”). 
63 2 PA. CONS. STAT. § 762(a)(2)(ii) (2011). 
64 2 PA. CONS. STAT. § 501(a) (2011) (emphasis added). 
65 2 PA. CONS. STAT. § 101 (2011). 
66  Id. An example of an independent commission would be the 
Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission. "The Commission is an 
independent governmental commission. The Commission is considered an 
independent agency and a 'Commonwealth Agency' for the purposes of 
Subchapter A of Chapter 5 of Title 2 (relating to practice and procedure of 
Commonwealth agencies)." Commonwealth v. CSX Transp., Inc., 639 A.2d 
1213, 1214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (citations omitted). 
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"Commonwealth agencies" is quite broad and encompasses considerably 
more than administrative agencies as traditionally understood.67  Unfortu-
nately, this offers little to clarify what is a regulatory statute, who or what 
administers a regulatory statute, and therefore what, if any, functional 
limitation is imposed on the Governor by the Code's language in Subsection 
(f)(1) of 7301. 
Section 762 of the Judicial Code also states: "The term 'regulatory 
statute' as used in this subparagraph does not include any provision of Title 
18 (relating to crimes and offenses)."68  Does this language suggest that 
criminal statutes, as contained in the Pennsylvania Crimes Code,69 are not 
regulatory statutes and thus beyond the reach of the Governor's suspension 
powers? Again, the answer is not entirely clear. The quoted language is self-
limiting in that it specifies "as used in this subparagraph." In other words, it 
cannot be fairly concluded from this language that criminal statutes are 
distinct from regulatory statutes as the latter term is used in Subsection (f)(1) 
of 7301 or, for that matter, as that term is used anywhere else throughout the 
Pennsylvania Statutes. However, in United States v. Conley, the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania stated that Section 
5513 of the Crimes Code (relating to the conduct of an illegal gambling 
business) is a "criminal statute, rather than a regulatory statute."70 Therefore, 
                                                        
67  See also OTHER STATE AGENCIES, PENNSYLVANIA STATE 
GOVERNMENT HOMEPAGE, http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt? 
open=512&objID=20598&PageID=1052160&mode=2 (last visted Jan. 25, 
2012). A perusal of the website reveals a comprehensive list of over 30 
Commonwealth "agencies," along with a variety of other "offices," 
"commissions & councils," "boards," and "bureaus & authorities." While the 
list of agencies includes full-on administrative agencies such as the 
Department of Health and PEMA, it also includes clearly non-administrative 
entities such as "Corrections," the "Pennsylvania State Police," and the state's 
"General Counsel." 
68 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 762(a)(2)(ii) (2011). 
69 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 101 (2011). 
70 833 F. Supp. 1121, 1160 (W.D. Pa. 1993), vacated on other grounds, 
37 F.3d 970 (3d Cir. 1994). "Section 5513 is found in the Pennsylvania 
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it may be a tenable inference that the Governor may not suspend the 
provisions of any criminal statute included in the Pennsylvania Crimes Code. 
Whatever varying conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing 
discussion, it is clear that the Governor is authorized to suspend provisions of 
a regulatory statute administered by a Commonwealth agency. Pennsylvania's 
Disease Prevention and Control Law71  (DPCL) is a prime example of a 
regulatory statute administered by a Commonwealth agency. The final 
authority to implement and enforce provisions of the DPCL is vested in the 
State Department of Health.72 The purpose of the DPCL is the prevention and 
control of communicable and non-communicable diseases.73 As such, the law 
is indisputably a "result of the exercise of the state's police power to enact 
regulations to promote the public health . . . ."74 These observations contribute 
to the conclusion that the Governor could almost certainly exercise his 
emergency management powers in suspending provisions of the DPCL. 
The DPCL permits the State Advisory Health Board to issue rules and 
regulations regarding, among other things, "the enforcement of isolation, 
quarantine and other control measures," and "the immunization and 
vaccination of persons and animals."75 Additionally, municipalities with their 
                                                                                                                              
Criminal Code and is defined there as a first degree misdemeanor. The 
General Assembly of the Commonwealth defined Section 5513(a) as a crime, 
not a regulatory provision." Id. 
71 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 521.1–.21 (2011). 
72 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 521.3(b) (2011). Local boards of health and 
local departments of health, subject to the supervision of the State 
Department of Health, are directed to prevent and control disease locally, 
including outbreaks in schools. Id. at § 521.3(a). The State Secretary of 
Health, upon a finding of inadequate prevention and control measures 
adopted by these local boards and departments, may direct the State 
Department of Health to intervene. Id. at § 521.3(c). 
73 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 521.3(b) (2011). 
74  Commonwealth v. CSX Transp., Inc., 639 A.2d 1213, 1214 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1994). 
75 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 521.16(a)(5)–(6) (2011). 
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own boards of health or departments of health may enact ordinances or issue 
rules and regulations "relating to disease prevention and control."76 
Presumably, Subsection (f)(1) of 7301 empowers the Governor to suspend 
any-and-all such ordinances, rules, or regulations. 
This is not to suggest that the Governor could abjectly ignore procedural 
due process protections as they relate to the activities of quarantine or 
isolation. DPCL Sections 521.7 and 521.11(a.2) provide for a hearing by a 
court when individuals suspected of being ill with communicable diseases 
refuse to submit to "examination and diagnosis" and "treatment." Individuals 
who refuse to be examined may be "committed by the court to an institution 
. . . ."77 Similarly, when individuals refuse treatment, "the court shall . . . order 
such person to be committed to an appropriate institution or hospital . . . ."78 
Consequently, there does not appear to be support for the Governor, even 
during a declared disaster emergency, to attempt to circumvent procedures 
engaging the courts in this active role.79 
                                                        
76 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 521.16(c) (2011). 
77 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 521.7 (2011). 
78 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 521.11(a.2) (2011). 
79 Cf. Counterterrorism, Planning, Preparedness and Response Act, 35 
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2140.301 (2011) (Authorizing the Governor to 
"temporarily isolate or quarantine an individual or groups of individuals 
through a written order if delay in imposing the isolation or quarantine 
through judicial proceedings . . . would significantly jeopardize the . . . ability 
to prevent or limit the transmission of a contagious or potentially contagious 
disease to others."). Of particular note, an order to isolate or quarantine issued 
without prior judicial approval "shall not require a declaration of disaster 
emergency by the Governor in order to be effective." Id. See THE MODEL 
STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (MSEHPA) (Ctr. for Law and the 
Pub.’s Health 2004), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/ 
MSEHPA.pdf. The MSEHPA provides "conditions and principles" for 
protecting the substantive rights of isolated or quarantined individuals, stating 
"[i]solation and quarantine must be by the least restrictive means necessary to 
prevent the spread of a contagious or possibly contagious disease to others 
. . . ." MSEHPA § 604(b)(1). It is worth noting that in enacting the 
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Finally, it is useful to look to other state's emergency management laws 
to compare the suspension powers granted to those states' governors with the 
suspension powers granted to Pennsylvania's Governor. This analysis reveals 
that the majority of governors are specifically authorized to suspend 
"regulatory statutes" or the "provisions of any regulatory statute."80  Only 
seven states authorize their governors to suspend any statute or law 
whatsoever. 81  Finally, the remaining four states appear to constrain their 
                                                                                                                              
Counterterrorism Act, the PA General Assembly adopted neither the 
"conditions and principles" nor the "least-restrictive-means" requirement of 
the MSEHPA. 
80 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8571 (1990) (Noting that "[d]uring a 
state of war emergency or a state of emergency the Governor may suspend 
any regulatory statute, or statute prescribing the procedure for conduct of 
state business, or the orders, rules, or regulations of any state agency, 
including subdivision (d) of Section 1253 of the Unemployment Insurance 
Code, where the Governor determines and declares that strict compliance 
with any statute, order, rule, or regulation would in any way prevent, hinder, 
or delay the mitigation of the effects of the emergency."). See also LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 29:724 (1993) (describing that "in addition to any other powers 
conferred upon the governor by law, he may . . . [s]uspend the provisions of 
any regulatory statute prescribing the procedures for conduct of state 
business, or the orders, rules, or regulations of any state agency, if strict 
compliance with the provisions of any statute, order, rule, or regulation would 
in any way prevent, hinder, or delay necessary action in coping with the 
emergency."). See generally the similar laws of Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Texas, and West Virginia similarly 
reference their governors' ability to suspend "regulatory statutes" during 
emergencies. 
81 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 28-9(a) (1975) (which notes that "the 
governor is authorized and empowered to modify or suspend in whole or in 
part . . . any statute, regulation or requirement or part thereof whenever the 
Governor finds such statute, regulation or requirement, or part thereof, is in 
conflict with the efficient and expeditious execution of civil preparedness 
functions or the protection of the public health"); see also N.Y. EXECUTIVE 
LAW § 29-a (1978) (which provides that "the governor may by executive 
order temporarily suspend specific provisions of any statute, local law, 
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governor's suspension powers. For example, while Michigan's governor may 
"[s]uspend a regulatory statute, order or rule," the state legislature was 
explicit that this power does not extend to "the suspension of criminal process 
and procedures."82 Idaho, South Carolina, and South Dakota only permit their 
governors to suspend "the provisions of any regulation," "the provisions of 
existing regulations," and "any rules of any state agency," respectively.83 In 
these states' emergency management laws, any reference to the suspension of 
statutes, regulatory or otherwise, is absent. 
B. SEPARATION OF POWERS 
The legal principles embodied in the doctrine of the separation of 
powers operate to fundamentally curb gubernatorial overreaching. "The 
separation of governmental powers into legislative, executive, and judicial is 
provided for in practically all the American state constitutions," and is 
designed to preclude one branch or actor representing that branch from 
interfering with or encroaching upon the basic powers of another branch or 
actor representing that branch.84 In the context of the exercise of emergency 
management powers, it has been argued that state governors, embodying 
executive power, on occasion invade the spheres of the legislature or the 
courts. What is the scope of the Pennsylvania Governor's emergency 
management powers vis-à-vis the Pennsylvania General Assembly and the 
state's system of courts? 
                                                                                                                              
ordinance, or orders, rules or regulations or parts thereof, of any agency 
during a state disaster emergency, if compliance with such provisions would 
prevent, hinder, or delay action necessary to cope with the disaster." 
Connecticut and New York are joined by Arizona, Maine, Maryland, 
Missouri, and Tennessee in granting apparently broad suspension powers to 
their governors. 
82 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 30.405(a) (1990). 
83 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 46-1008(5)(a) (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 
§ 25-1-440(a)(3) (2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-48A-5 (2004). 
84 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 215 (2009). 
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1. THE PENNSYLVANIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
As discussed in the preceding section, the Governor is authorized to 
"[s]uspend the provisions of any regulatory statute prescribing the procedures 
for conduct of Commonwealth business," if he deems it necessary to cope 
with an emergency.85 Yet, the Governor's action in suspending the operation 
of laws enacted by the General Assembly constitutes something beyond the 
exercise of traditional executive powers. The Pennsylvania Constitution 
states: "No power of suspending laws shall be exercised unless by the 
Legislature or by its authority."86  While it is true that such an action is 
countenanced by authorizing legislation, the exercise of such authority could 
be used to countermand, at least for a time, any number of laws adopted by 
the General Assembly. Hence, in exercising this particular emergency 
management power, the Governor can potentially intrude upon the legislative 
function. 
Nevertheless, an unassailable tenet of the separation-of-powers doctrine 
is that the "Legislative branch of government creates laws," and that the 
Governor is bound to "execute the laws and not to create or interpret them."87 
Not only does the General Assembly create the laws, but it is also vested with 
the power to amend or repeal laws.88 Accordingly, the General Assembly, 
should it see fit, could amend or repeal Subsection (f)(1) of 7301 and thereby 
"dial back" the Governor's ability to suspend laws during declared disaster 
emergencies. Moreover, Subsection (c) of 7301 limits the Governor's ability 
to declare and maintain a state of disaster emergency by granting the General 
Assembly the power to terminate a state of emergency at any time by 
concurrent resolution.89 Presumably, if the General Assembly disfavors the 
                                                        
85 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(f)(1) (1988). 
86 PA. CONST. art. I, § 12. 
87 Shapp v. Butera, 348 A.2d 910, 914 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975). 
88 35 PA. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
89 See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(c) (2011) (The NGA characterizes the 
ability of a legislature to intervene to terminate a declaration of a state of 
emergency as a "limitation on emergency powers," and notes that in at least 
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Governor's suspension of a law or laws, it could override that suspension by 
undoing the declaration of a disaster emergency. 
Finally, consider that Subsection (f)(1) of 7301 also authorizes the 
Governor to "[suspend] . . . the orders, rules or regulations of any 
Commonwealth agency . . . ."90 As noted earlier, "Commonwealth agency" is 
a defined term which explicitly excludes "the General Assembly and its 
officers and agencies."91 From this it may be concluded that the internal 
operating rules or the investigations and studies of the General Assembly and 
its legislative committees are beyond the reach of the Governor's suspension 
powers. As one example, the Pennsylvania Statutes call for the establishment 
of "a continuing joint legislative commission, to be known as the Joint State 
Government Commission," comprised of members of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate.92  The Commission has the "power" and 
"duty" to "make such investigations and studies and to gather such 
information as may be deemed useful to the General Assembly and the 
standing committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives."93 The 
Commission would clearly be an entity consisting of officers of the General 
Assembly, and thus its activities arguably would be immune from the 
Governor's interference. 
                                                                                                                              
12 states the legislature is empowered to do so.). NGA, GOVERNOR’S GUIDE, 
supra note 5, at 14–15. 
90 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(f)(1) (2011). 
91  See 2 PA. CONS. STAT. § 101 (2011) (defining the term 
"Commonwealth agency" to cover any "executive agency" or "independent 
agency." According to the statutory definitions, the term "executive agency 
. . . does not include . . . the General Assembly and its officers and agencies 
. . . ." The term "independent agency . . . does not include . . . the General 
Assembly and its officers and agencies."). 
92  46 PA. CONS. STAT. § 65 (2011); see also THE JOINT STATE 
GOVERNMENT COMMISSION, http://jsg.legis.state.pa.us/ (last visited Apr. 15, 
2010). 
93 46 PA. CONS. STAT. § 66(a) (2011). 
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2. THE PENNSYLVANIA COURTS 
The Pennsylvania Constitution provides: "[t]he judicial power of the 
Commonwealth shall be vested in a unified judicial system consisting of the 
Supreme Court, the Superior Court, the Commonwealth Court, courts of 
common pleas, community courts, . . . [and] such other courts as may be 
provided by law and justices of the peace."94  The judiciary is a coequal 
branch of the Commonwealth government.95 While the General Assembly 
may create "additional courts or divisions of existing courts" and may abolish 
"any statutory court or division thereof,"96 the General Assembly may not 
exercise any power specifically entrusted to the judiciary.97 
Likewise, the Governor is limited in his authority with respect to the 
courts. The Pennsylvania Constitution grants the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court "the power to prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure and 
the conduct of all courts, . . . and the administration of all courts and 
supervision of all officers of the Judicial Branch . . . ."98 In First Judicial 
District of Pennsylvania v. PHRC, the PA Supreme Court averred: 
[I]nterference in the operation of courts is prohibited by 
the separation of powers doctrine. The supreme court has 
the sole power and the responsibility to supervise the 
                                                        
94 PA. CONST. art. V, § 1. 
95 Commonwealth v. Sutley, 378 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 1977) (Noting the 
well-established principle that "the judicial branch is not subordinate to the 
other branches of government but is co-equal, distinct, and independent."). 
96 PA. CONST. art. V, § 8. 
97  Kremer v. State Ethics Comm’n, 469 A.2d 593, 595 (Pa. 1983) 
(holding that "[u]nder the doctrine of separation of powers, the legislature 
may not exercise any power specifically entrusted to the judiciary, which is a 
co-equal branch of government" (citations omitted)). 
98  PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 
pursuant to Article V, Section 10 of the Constitution, recently adopted rules 
for maintaining court operations during a pandemic, natural disaster, or other 
public emergency; see also 201 PA. CODE §§ 1950–1954 (2011). 
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"practice, procedure, and the conduct of all courts." 
[T]he executive branch of government . . . may [not] 
constitutionally infringe on this judicial prerogative.99 
Consequently, despite the Emergency Management Services Code 
authorizing the Governor to "suspend the . . . orders, rules or regulations of 
any Commonwealth agency,"100 as well as "[t]ransfer the direction, personnel 
or functions of Commonwealth agencies or units thereof,"101 it is evident that 
the PA Supreme Court has "sole" power over practically all aspects of 
judicial administration. This reading is further supported by the fact that the 
term "Commonwealth agency" as employed in the Code does not include the 
courts.102 
An example of a critical rule adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court is the "speedy trial" or "prompt trial" rule.103 The prompt trial rule was 
recommended by the Criminal Procedural Rules Committee,104 an advisory 
arm to the court, pursuant to the court's ruling in Commonwealth v. 
Hamilton.105 In that case, the court held that Pennsylvania's "two term" or 
"180 day" rule was inadequate to protect the interests of those whom the 
Commonwealth accuses of criminal violations.106 Currently Rule 600, the 
                                                        
99 727 A.2d 1110, 1112 (Pa. 1999). 
100 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(f)(1) (2011). 
101 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(f)(3) (2011). 
102 2 PA. CONS. STAT. § 101 (2011). 
103 See PA. R. CRIM. P. 600 (2011). 
104 See THE UNITED JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF PENNSYLVANIA, available at 
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/T/BoardsCommittees/CrimProcRules/ (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
105 297 A.2d 127, 128 (Pa. 1972). 
106 See id. The court criticized the rule, which provided for discharge 
from imprisonment of any accused who had not been tried during the second 
term after his commitment, unless the delay happened on an application of or 
with the assent of the accused. This discharge from imprisonment, however, 
did not bar prosecution of the charges and only admitted the defendant to bail 
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"prompt trial" rule, provides reasonable time periods within which trials must 
commence.107 As discussed above, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court possesses 
the sole power to adopt such rules. Furthermore, the court is not a 
"Commonwealth agency" as defined by the Pennsylvania Statutes. 
Consequently, it would appear that the Governor, even during a declared 
disaster emergency, could not suspend or otherwise interfere with this or any 
other court rule.108 
C. JUDICIAL REVIEW 
While research into the availability and application of judicial review to 
the Governor's actions yields sparse results, some record of review exists with 
regard to the Governor's issuance of executive orders. The Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court in National Solid Wastes Management Association v. 
Casey 109  noted that only executive orders which "serve to implement or 
supplement the constitution or statutes," are subject to judicial review.110 
                                                                                                                              
until the cause was ultimately brought to trial. Furthermore, the rule was 
designed to apply only to committed defendants awaiting trial and provided 
no relief for defendants who were already on bail status but were being 
denied a speedy trial. Id. at 130–31. According to the court, the rule was 
inadequate because it resulted in "inordinate delay between the institution of 
charges and the trial, . . . [was] effective only when the accused demand[ed] 
his release prior to trial, . . . [and] fail[ed] to require dismissal of the charges 
with prejudice." Id. at 131. 
107 PA. R. CRIM. P. 600 (2012). 
108 But see People v. Wright, 748 N.Y.S.2d 199 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2002) 
(holding that the New York Governor could suspend certain "speedy trial" 
requirements of the State’s Criminal Procedure Law during the declared state 
of emergency following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks); see also 
People v. Haneiph, 745 N.Y.S.2d 405 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2002) (holding the 
same and thus refusing to dismiss defendant's charges). 
109 580 A.2d 893 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990). 
110 See id. at 897–98 (noting that the court identified three types of 
executive orders: (1) formal, ceremonial, political orders, usually issued as 
proclamations; (2) orders which communicate to subordinate officials 
requested or suggested directions for the execution of the duties of the 
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Typically, actions invoking such review challenge the executive order on the 
grounds that the Governor issued it in the absence of either constitutional 
authority or a legislative mandate.111 Accordingly, what is the proper standard 
and scope of judicial review for executive orders? 
"An executive order issued by the Governor which serves to implement 
or supplement the Constitution or a statute has the force of law, and therefore 
may be characterized and treated as an administrative regulation, at least for 
purposes of judicial review."112  A reviewing court will ordinarily afford 
considerable weight and deference to an administrative agency's 
promulgation of regulations pursuant to the statute it administers. "Our 
standard of review over regulations is very limited. We will not substitute our 
judgment for the agency's and will not strike down regulations unless a clear 
abuse of discretion is shown or the agency has exceeded its statutory 
powers."113 If the Governor's executive order is analogous to an administra-
tive regulation (for purposes of judicial review), it is reasonable to surmise 
that the review of such an order will be limited and highly deferential. 
The sufficiency of the Pennsylvania Governor's executive order 
declaring a disaster emergency and the related exercise of his suspension 
powers were addressed by the Commonwealth Court in In re Farrow.114 In 
that case, Petitioner Paula Brown challenged the Governor's extension of a 
statutorily mandated filing time for nomination petitions by his issuance of an 
                                                                                                                              
Executive Branch of government; and (3) orders which serve to implement or 
supplement the constitution or statutes). 
111 Id. at 898. 
112  36 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE § 166:77 (2010) (citing 
Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Casey, 580 A.2d 893 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1990)). 
113 Brocal Corp. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp., 528 A.2d 114, 121 
(Pa. 1987); see also 36 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE § 166:342 
(2010). 
114 754 A.2d (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000). 
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executive order due to a "sudden and severe winter storm."115 Brown asserted 
that the Governor lacked the requisite authority because "there was no 
legitimate emergency" and the order itself "did not provide that a 'State of 
Emergency' was declared throughout the State of Pennsylvania."116 
The Governor filed a petition to intervene, which the court granted.117 
As justification for the extension of the filing deadline, the Governor cited 
Section 7301(f)(1) of the Emergency Management Services Code as 
authorizing the "suspen[sion] [of] the provisions of any regulatory statute 
prescribing the procedures for conduct of Commonwealth business" during a 
state of emergency. 118  The court, while conceding that the Governor's 
executive order did not explicitly state that he was declaring a "State of 
Emergency," assumed a highly deferential posture and found that the order 
"did in fact [declare such an emergency] because it contained all the 
requirements to so declare a state of emergency."119 The court was satisfied 
that the Governor had discerned that a disaster emergency existed and that, as 
a result of the emergency conditions, it was "necessary to extend the filing 
deadline for all nomination petitions by 24 hours in order to give all 
candidates a fair and reasonable opportunity to file their petitions."120 
Deferring to the Governor's legislatively authorized power to issue an 
executive order declaring a disaster emergency and to exercise his suspension 
                                                        
115  See id. at 33–34 (noting that Brown specifically objected to the 
nomination petition filed by James Farrow for the Office of State 
Representative of the 162nd District in the Democratic Primary to be held on 
April 4, 2000. Nomination petitions were required to be filed no later than 
5:00 PM on January 25, 2000, pursuant to the Election Code, 25 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 2873; Farrow filed his nomination petition on January 26, 2000, 
beyond the original deadline but within the extension granted by the 
Governor). 
116 Id. at 134. 
117 Id. at 34 n.2. 
118 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(f)(1) (2011). 
119 In re Farrow, 754 A.2d at 35. 
120 Id. 
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powers in extending the filing deadline, the court denied Brown's petition.121 
While the Commonwealth Court stopped short of outlining in concrete terms 
the parameters of its review, it acknowledged and fulfilled its duty to review 
the Governor's actions.122 This case demonstrates that, when called up to do 
so, Pennsylvania courts will not abdicate their responsibility to review the 
actions of the Governor in connection with a disaster emergency and that 
review will likely be limited in scope and highly deferential. 
D. SCOPE OF THE DISASTER 
The Pennsylvania Code permits the Governor to declare a disaster 
emergency "upon finding that a disaster has occurred or that the occurrence 
or the threat of a disaster is imminent."123 The Code defines "disaster" to 
include "[a] man-made disaster, natural disaster or war-caused disaster."124 Of 
interest, the Code discusses and defines a "local emergency" as something 
separate and apart from other types of disaster emergencies. "Local 
emergency" is defined as follows: 
The condition declared by the local governing body 
when in their judgment the threat or actual occurrence of 
a disaster is or threatens to be of sufficient severity and 
magnitude to warrant coordinated local government 
action to prevent or alleviate the damage, loss, hardship 
or suffering threatened or caused thereby. A local 
emergency arising wholly or substantially out of a 
                                                        
121 Id. at 36. 
122 See id. at 35 (noting that the Pennsylvania Election Code is a clear 
example of a regulatory statute); see also Commonwealth v. Wadzinkski, 422 
A.2d 124, 127 (Pa. 1980) (referring to the Election Code as a regulatory 
statute in an action challenging the constitutionality of a provision imposing 
criminal sanctions upon a candidate who publishes a political advertisement 
referring to an opponent without first complying with prescribed notice 
requirements). 
123 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7301(c) (2011). 
124  35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7102 (2011). Specific definitions are also 
provided for each of these three types of disasters. 
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resource shortage may be declared only by the 
Governor, upon petition of the local governing body, 
when he deems the threat or actual occurrence of a 
disaster to be of sufficient severity and magnitude to 
warrant coordinated local government action to prevent 
or alleviate the damage, loss, hardship or suffering 
threatened or caused thereby.125 
From this definition, it can be deduced that the primary responsibility and 
authority to declare a local disaster emergency rests with the local governing 
body. Findings by the Governor are not a condition precedent, and the local 
disaster emergency is declared without the imprimatur of a gubernatorial 
executive order. Furthermore, only under circumstances characterized by a 
"resource shortage"126 and only "upon petition of the local governing body"127 
may the Governor intervene to declare a local disaster emergency. 
The Governor can however, intervene on his own authority, with or 
without the petition of the local governing body. This could occur when the 
Governor arrives at an independent determination that the emergency, despite 
being localized, is of such a scale that it could inflict severe "damage, loss, 
hardship, or suffering" upon a "substantial number of citizens" and that the 
measures pursued by the local governing body are inadequate to meet the 
emergency. The Code's definition of "disaster emergency" suggests the 
Governor could declare such a state and intervene when "conditions . . . [are] 
of such magnitude or severity as to render essential State supplementation of 
county and local efforts or resources exerted or utilized in alleviating the 
danger, damage, suffering or hardship faced."128 
                                                        
125 Id. (emphasis added). 
126  See id. (defining "Resource shortage" as "[t]he absence, 
unavailability or reduced supply of any raw or processed natural resource, or 
any commodities, goods or services of any kind which bear a substantial 
relationship to the health, safety, welfare and economic well-being of the 
citizens of this Commonwealth"). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear from the foregoing that governors across the states, including 
the Governor of Pennsylvania, while not given carte blanche to violate a 
statute or state constitution, undeniably have expansive emergency 
management powers. In the last ten years alone, numerous major natural and 
man-made disaster emergencies have prompted governors to exercise those 
powers. Unsurprisingly, the National Governors Association urges new and 
incoming governors to "learn quickly how to respond to emergency situations 
such as fires, floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornados, terrorist attacks, and 
pandemics."129 The NGA goes a step further, warning that a weak or flawed 
response to an emergency disaster "will likely [result in the governor] be[ing] 
held accountable and pay[ing] a price either in political capital or a loss of 
focus on his or her priority initiatives."130 
Moreover, any perceived encroachment on emergency management 
powers has faced staunch collective opposition by the governors. For 
example, during much of 2009, the Department of Defense and the NGA 
were at odds over a legislative proposal that was to transfer, from governors 
to the Secretary of Defense, the authority to command National Guard and 
U.S. military units dispatched to states during disaster emergencies.131 The 
NGA expressed grave doubts about the proposal, saying that such a power 
transfer would "invite confusion on critical command and control issues, 
complicate interagency planning, establish stove-piped response efforts, and 
interfere with governors' constitutional responsibilities to ensure the safety 
                                                        
129  Barry Van Lare, Risk Management Challenges for the New 
Governor, NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/OMCTRISKMANAGEME
NT.PDF. 
130 Id. 
131 See Reid Wilson, Governors Oppose DoD Emergency Powers, THE 
HILL, Aug. 10, 2009, available at http://thehill.com/homenews/ 
administration/54193-governors-oppose-dod-emergency-powers. 
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and security of their citizens."132 Despite this disagreement, on January 10, 
2010 President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13528 which created a 
Council of Governor's to advise the federal government on "(a) matters 
involving the National Guard of the various States; (b) homeland defense; (c) 
civil support; [and] (d) synchronization and integration of State and Federal 
military activities in the United States"; thus formalizing ongoing dialogue 
related to this potential shift in gubernatorial powers.133 
While it presently appears that the State Constitution and the Emergency 
Management Services Code infuse Pennsylvania's Governor with extensive 
and wide-ranging emergency management powers, these powers are not 
without limitation. The doctrine of the separation of powers, the ability of the 
legislature to overturn a gubernatorial emergency declaration, the prospect of 
judicial review, and the qualified limitation of suspension authority to 
"regulatory statutes" as evidenced by the text of the suspension clause itself, 
collectively impose meaningful checks to prevent the exploitation of such 
powers by the Governor. 
                                                        
132 Letter from Governor James H. Douglas and Governor Joe Manchin 
III to the Honorable Paul Stockton, Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs (Aug. 7, 2009), 
available at http://www.nga.org/cms/home/federal-relations/nga-letters/ 
executive-committee-letters/col2-content/main-content-list/title_august-7-
2009.html. 
133 Exec. Order No. 13528, 75 Fed. Reg. 2035 (Jan. 10, 2010), available 
at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/pdf/2010-705.pdf. 
